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Practical Aspects of Ohio Divorce Proceedings
Anthony R. Fiorette*
N ITS RELATION TO COMMUNITY WELFARE and national well-being,
"Family Law" is high in public interest.
In its administration, the courts are vested with an undefined
discretion within the framework of a statutory scheme.
In its enforcement, the lawyer, as an officer of the court,
occupies a top position of responsibility. The opportunity to deter,
and perhaps prevent, the ultimate dissolution of the family comes
first to him, and carries with it, a challenge to his patience,
tolerance and particularly to his concept of social service.
When pursuit of divorce and consequent family disorganiza-
tion appears unavoidable, counsel is accorded a further opportu-
nity to minimize expenses, avoid scandal and bitterness, and to
plan the future welfare of the minor children and the estranged
spouses.
In performing this task he seeks to evaluate how the court
may view the available evidence, and what it might do in award-
ing custody and alimony, ever mindful of the fluidity of the trial
court's authority.
Interesting rather than informative, is the often made state-
ment that in "domestic relations" matters the court first decides,
and then finds the law. The basis, if any, for this view may have
its origin in the belief that the Ohio Statutes appear to be
tailored to accommodate the ideology and philosophy of the trial
judge.'
"Upon proof to the satisfaction of the court" is the statutory
key to the exercise of judicial discretion in granting a divorce.2
"Upon satisfactory proof of any of the charges in the petition"
the court shall make such order for the disposition, care and
maintenance of the children as is just and in their best interest.3
As to alimony and division of property, the trial court is
permitted a free and full exercise of its general equity powers as
it determines will serve the ends of justice. 4
*Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
' § 3105.01 et seq. Ohio Revised Code.
2 § 3105.10 ORC.
i §§ 3105.21, 3109.04 ORC.
4 §§ 3105.18, 3105.20 ORC.
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The broad sweep of this statutory authority has not been
restricted by judicial construction. 5 Actually, reviewing courts
have approved its undefined nature. They have uniformly re-
fused to set aside a decree unless the "record" fails to disclose
some evidence of a substantial nature supporting the judgment.6
On the other hand, the decisions have established objective
standards for the exercise of this discretion by defining the duty
imposed on the trial court. The state is a party to every divorce
or alimony proceeding, and in Ohio where no provision by law
is made for actual representation, the court represents the state.7
It is the duty of the court to use every proper means to reconcile
parties seeking divorce or separation.8 The family relation should
be preserved until such time as it appears to the court in a
divorce proceeding that a legal right to a divorce has been estab-
lished.9
Because of the public interest in the preservation of the
marital status, divorce suits are accorded different treatment
from ordinary civil actions and it becomes the duty of the court
to be vigilant against collusion and to see that there is compliance
with applicable statutes.'0 Whether the trial court thinks it would
be better for the parties to have a decree of divorce is not a
controlling consideration," nor is it proper to grant a divorce be-
cause the parties will never reconcile or live together. 12 Neither
counsel nor the court may author or advise an agreement between
the parties to a divorce action where among other things contem-
plated is the withdrawal of one spouse from the contest to permit
the procurement of a decree of divorce by the other.13 A party
to a collusive agreement will be denied relief.14
By amending statutes in force, the General Assembly, in 1951,
completely eliminated the element of aggression as controlling
the discretion of the trial court in awarding alimony to either
5 DeMilo v. Watson, Exr., 166 0. S. 433, 436 (1957).
6 Dursa v. Dursa, 78 0. L. Abs. 498, 500 (1958).
7 Pashko v. Pashko, 45 0. Ops. 498, 500 (1951).
8 Pashko v. Pashko, supra, p. 501.
9 Phillips v. Phillips, 48 0. App. 322, 324 (1933).
10 State ex rel. Haun v. Hoffman, 145 0. S. 31 (1945).
11 Phillips v. Phillips, supra, note 9, p. 323.
12 Sevi v. Sevi, 83 0. L. Abs. 257, 259 (1959).
13 Maimone v. Maimone, 55 0. L. Abs. 566, 573 (1949).
14 Maimone v. Maimone, supra.
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the husband or the wife,15 notwithstanding the court's language
in Hunt v. Hunt.16 The offending party cannot be deprived of all
rights bestowed by the marital relationship if to do so would
shock the conscience of the court.17
Not to be minimized in its practical consequences, and which
provides a directional guide to the court's discretion, is the judi-
cially imposed clean hands doctrine. In theory, the rule provides
that a divorce shall never be granted against an innocent spouse,
and that a divorce shall not be granted either spouse where
each spouse proves the other guilty of marital fault constituting
grounds for divorce.ls Of ancient origin, the doctrine seems to
rest on the equitable principle that one may not be heard to
complain of an injury from the acts of another when he is subject
to a charge of a similar nature. Its true function, however, is to
effectuate the public policy against dissolution of the family
through easy divorces.
In applying this rule the trial judge is vested with the widest
discretion,19 and at his discretion the trial judge may, or may not,
apply the rule, provided, of course, the spouse to whom the
decree is awarded has made sufficient proof to authorize it.20
Where the action for divorce is brought on the statutory ground
that "either party had a husband or wife living at the time of
the marriage," the court will not apply the rule. 21
The social usefulness of the rule has been questioned for the
reason, among others, that it mistakenly assumes dissatisfied
spouses living in an atmosphere of discontent and distrust can
preserve and maintain a family unit helpful to the community.
In this state, it appears the rule will continue in force until
legislative action intervenes.22
Avoid Scandal and Bitterness
Of the precautions to be heeded, the first to be noted is to
avoid scandal and bitterness. The tension suffered in seeking or
15 Gage v. Gage, 165 0. S. 462, 464 (1956).
16 169 0. S. 276, 282 (1959).
17 Nelson v. Nelson, 108 0. App. 365, 369 (1958).
Is Slyh v. Slyh, 72 0. L. Abs. 537, 543 (1955).
19 Flatter v. Flatter, 71 0. L. Abs. 89, 91 (1954).
20 Slyh v. Slyh, supra, note 18, p. 540.
21 Smith v. Smith, 72 0. App. 203, 217 (1943); Eggleston v. Eggleston, 156
0. S. 422, 428 (1952).
22 Keath v. Keath, 78 0. App. 517, 520 (1946).
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in defending divorce and alimony suits takes its toll of every
member of the family. But, the parents present the immediate
problem. Many appear in shock from humiliation and injured
pride. Others, motivated by anger and hate seem bent on seeking
vengeance. If allowed to persist these emotions become serious
obstacles for court and counsel. None will dispute that bitterness
and scandal serve no useful purpose in resolving any phase of
the marital controversy.
Admittedly, the client's tremulous agitation is not easy to
neutralize. But some soothing influence is needed to restore
normalcy of mind and capacity for calm reflection if a fair and
reasonable result is to be reached. Whatever treatment may be
required, counsel must administer it.
Haste or Delay
Another absorbing problem is encountered in determining
whether the family interests justify haste or delay. Delay may
aid, but haste may preclude, a reconciliation of the spouses.
Experience would seem to favor rational use of time in seeking
to preserve the marriage.
The foremost and primary concern of counsel and court is
the welfare of minor children. This paramount duty tends to be
ignored by facilitating hasty dissolution of the family unit. Even
where violence may be threatened, a quick divorce is not per se
the solution. Less drastic and more effective legal procedures are
available to prevent physical harm.
Moreover, if it be the prevailing judicial view that 'divorce
suits are accorded a different treatment from ordinary civil
actions,' 23 then this view may be construed to declare that efforts
to preserve a family ought not to be compressed to fit the time
requirements of a crowded or light court docket or of the judge's
calendar. The convenience of administration and of counsel
should yield to assure a just result.
No one can prescribe a formula for reconciling unhappy
spouses. Each case is unto itself. Every case commands patience
and resourcefulness of the highest order. When these fail, and
pursuit of divorce seems inevitable, then plans should be con-
sidered for such matters as division of property, alimony, custody
and support for minor children.
23 State ex rel. Haun v. Hoffman, 145 0. S. 31 (1945).
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Though collusion to obtain a divorce is against public policy,
it is equally true that an amicable and reasonable disposition of
property rights, obligations of support, custody and other related
matters is clearly in the public interest. In these particulars the
spouses have the advantage of knowledge and time to effect a
result more suitable to each than what a court may order from
the evidence before it.
Factual Information Supported by Corroboration in
Preparation for Trial
Typical of self-serving assumptions counsel can not afford to
enjoy, is that which induces belief in an easy disposition of the
case. Normally, the emotional and lengthy recitals by the client
of his unhappy marital experiences neither provide what is needed
nor establish adequate proof therefor. To be effective in negotia-
tion, in trial or in giving advice, the need for having all available
information organized, and evaluated, can not be underestimated.
Inquiry into personal and private affairs always presents diffi-
culties, and lack of funds imposes further limitations. Neverthe-
less adeptness and effort in the execution of this responsibility
is expected of counsel.
A list of marital matters to be examined and appraised should
include:
1. Place and date of marriage-how long engaged-parental
approval or absence thereof.
2. Place and date of birth of each spouse and child.
3. State of health of same . . . any past or present need for
medical, mental or dental treatment.
4. Each spouse's family background . . . re marital, finan-
cial, and other difficulties.
5. Schooling and education of each spouse.
6. Behavior pattern and unusual traits of each spouse before
and during marriage.
7. Behavior pattern and unusual traits of the children.
8. Attitude toward religion and church activities.
9. Origin and duration of marital dissension.
10. Influence, if any, of relatives, in-laws, divorced friends,
and other persons.
11. Possible extra-marital activities.
12. Possible pregnancy of wife.
13. Question of the paternity of any child.
14. Social-civic-business activities of each spouse.
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15. Spouse participation in family management.
16. Living standards . . . re . . . family income.
17. Wife's earnings, if any, how used.
18. Husband's employment record.
19. Companionship between spouses or lack thereof.
20. Specific acts relied upon for divorce or alimony.
21. Specific circumstances that precipitated seeking legal
relief.
22. Present and previous marital domicile.
23. Available corroborating proof of all the foregoing.
Full disclosure of the financial status of each spouse should
be established, by an exchange of affidavits covering, if possible:
1. Earnings of each and disposition thereof during marriage.
2. What assets each brought to the marriage.
3. Present holdings of cash and securities of each. How
acquired-where kept. Safe deposit box, if any.
4. Antenuptial agreement, if any.
5. Receivables . . . rents, loans, annuities, trust income and
other, if any.
6. Expected inheritances.
7. Real estate . . . location . . . value . . . when and how
acquired-escrow agent-cost-how paid-legal evidence
of title.
8. Household goods, automobiles, boats, heirlooms and other
tangible property of value.
9. Nature and amount of life insurance held by each . . .
beneficiaries thereof.
10. Business transactions between spouses, if any, circum-
stances thereof.
11. Current family income.
12. Current living expenses.
13. Debts owed and how current.
14. Minimum requirements of the minor children and of each
spouse, if separated.
Until final hearing, preliminary orders are effective instru-
ments for the preservation of family assets and for the enforce-
ment of marital rights. To be considered is the need for an order:
1. Not to molest or harm.
2. Not dispose of assets.
3. Excluding from marital home.
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4. For temporary alimony.
5. For temporary custody.
6. For expenses, attorney fees.
Service of Process
Existing circumstances necessarily control whether the serv-
ice of process shall be personal service or notice by publication.
Where personal service cannot be obtained on the defendant in
Ohio, the limitations imposed thereby on the court's authority
should be made clear to the client.
The Petition
Appropriate regard for the dignity and possible rehabilitation
of the family is indicated in drafting the petition. Counsel should
not present a bill of infamy. Abandoned defamatory allegations
may furnish the offended spouse with a basis for charging ex-
treme cruelty. Pleadings should be brief,24 concise, and legally
sufficient, and not serve as scandal sheets to degrade character
and further estrange the spouses.
Real estate should be adequately described therein to invoke
lis pendens, and in proper cases to empower the court to render
judgment in rem.2 5
In addition to reciting the particular remedies sought, the
prayer for relief should include a request for general relief.26
The Trial
It would seem unnecessary to remind counsel that his skill,
industry and the philosophy directing his efforts are mirrored in
the "record" he builds in conducting the trial. Significantly, some-
thing more than the client's case may be adjudged by "the
record."
There can be no judgment by default in a divorce or alimony
action. Failure to deny charges of marital fault can not be con-
sidered as an admission. And, admissions cannot be received
which the court has reason to believe were obtained by improper
means.27 By these rules and by Section 3105.10 R. C. a formal
trial is mandatory though the action is not contested.
24 Slyh v. Slyh, supra, note 18, p. 539.
25 § 2703.26 ORC; Cook et al. v. Mozer, 108 0. S. 30 (1923); Reed v. Reed,
121 0. S. 188 (1929).
26 Flatter v. Flatter, supra, note 19, p. 96.
27 Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 162 0. S. 119; 69 0. L. Abs. 341, 344 (1954).
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Counsel needs more than a barren file and persuasive oratory
when he enters the trial room. Quantum of proof, including
corroboration must be complied with.28 Trivia and incompatibility
are not grounds for divorce.29 In its sound discretion the court
may dismiss an uncontested divorce action.3 ° Where divorce and
alimony are denied, the court has no authority to grant custody.31
And on appeal, the reviewing court is restricted to the "record"
before it in ruling on an assignment of error.32
Pertinent facts relating to family finances, custody of minor
children, need for their support, and need for alimony should be
presented in evidence and made part of the record together with,
if there be one, the separation agreement.
Separation Agreement
Such agreement is authorized by Section 3103.06 0. R. C.,
and its validity is controlled by:
(a) Section 3103.05 0. R. C. which imposes the positive
limitation that such agreement shall be subject "to the
general rules which control the actions of persons oc-
cupying confidential relations," and
(b) Section 3105.18 0. R. C. which requires that the alimony
awarded by the court shall be reasonable "at the time
of the decree."
The trial court is under no compulsion to approve the agree-
ment of the parties, but will do so if the evidence shows its pro-
visions are fair, just, and reasonable.33
It is the husband's duty to advise the wife to seek counsel of
her own choice whenever legal advice will assist her in deciding
whether to enter into an agreement with him,34 and advice from
a law associate of the husband's attorney is not considered to be
that independent and impartial advice within the meaning of this
rule.3 5
28 Perry v. Perry, 100 0. App. 15, 19 (1955).
29 Kennedy v. Kennedy, 111 0. App. 432 (1959).
30 Lewis v. Lewis, 103 0. App. 129 (1956).
31 Haymie v. Haymie, 169 0. S. 467 (1959).
32 Davis v. Davis, 109 0. App. 519 (1959).
33 Brewer v. Brewer, 84 0. App. 35, 37 (1948).
34 Brewer v. Brewer, supra, p. 40.
35 26 Am. Jur. § 269, p. 877.
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